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Legislative Art as Policy and Pedagogy
Albert Stabler
University of  Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
The primary medium for artist Laurie Jo Reynolds is that of  political lobby-
ing. She refers to her practice as “legislative art,” adapting the term “legislative 
theater,” a technique for grassroots lawmaking developed and coined by Bra-
zilian director and playwright Augusto Boal, who both founded the Theater 
of  the Oppressed and served as a member of  the Rio city government from 
1993 to 1997. By linking the discourses of  art and law, Reynolds’ practice can 
be understood as a form of  education, highlighting the restrictions required for 
creativity, and the possibilities afforded by structure. In my essay I bring to-
gether European political theory, modern American politics, and contemporary 
conceptual art in order to magnify the possibilities of  what Friedrich Schiller 
called “aesthetic education.” While other scholars have understood art and art 
education as a process of  pleasurable exploration, or formal disciplinary explica-
tion, I hope to suggest a way of  engaging art education as an intellectual pursuit 
with open-ended political possibilities.
Keywords
Art education, political theory, Laurie Jo Reynolds, law, pedagogy, conceptual art
Stabler: Legislative art as Policy and Pedagogy
https://ir.uiowa.edu/mzwp/vol2016/iss1/6
DOI: 10.17077/2326-7070.1499
2Acknowlegements
Thanks to my advisor, Professor Jorge Lucero, for his constant encouragement, 
as well as Professor Jeff  Martin for his feedback on this piece, and for all of  his 
advice on revising my dissertation.
Introduction
In her work fighting against carceral solitary confinement, sex offender regis-
tries, and other extreme forms of  official punishment, Laurie Jo Reynolds has 
created and curated a variety of  visual documents and performances, but her 
primary focus has been on lobbying policymakers to reform and reduce highly 
punitive practices. And yet Reynolds has primarily identified herself  neither as 
an activist nor a lobbyist, but as an artist, referring to what she does as “legisla-
tive art.” This term has its specific origin in the “legislative theater” of  Brazilian 
theater director and politician Augusto Boal (1998), and thus relates to a Latin 
American context of  politicized artistic expression (and official repression) 
from the 1960s and 1970s. 
But the concept could have a wider historical and cultural resonance, 
referring to law and politics without having to refer strictly to legislatures. While 
Reynolds’ art, and the history it represents, has been largely overlooked by the 
academic art establishment, further unpacking of  the relationship between 
aesthetics and law might prompt conversation between those who do and those 
who do not recognize her gestures as artistic. My contention would be that 
simply recognizing the juridical and creative aspects of  both legal and artistic 
discourse will be enough to grant work like hers a fair hearing in relationship to 
visual, aural, kinetic, and other expressive registers. 
As a full-time high school art teacher in Chicago, I collaborated with 
Reynolds and her partner, Scott MacFarland, on two projects with my students 
on the subject of  torture. But rather than making curricular suggestions and 
establishing straightforward connections to classroom teaching, my intention in 
this essay is, through juxtaposing a variety of  recent and historical sources, to 
begin reconsidering the roles of  both art and education in a general picture of  
politics as a form of  (often brutal) creativity. Since the work of  any teacher is 
bound up with both imparting discipline and flexibility, relaying curricular goals 
and facilitating inventively, the broader relevance of  this discussion to classroom 
practice will hopefully be appreciated.
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Writing on law has identified relatively novel areas of  jurisprudence as ripe for 
creativity (Darcy & Powderly, 2010; Leckey, 2015). But more general analogies 
between law and aesthetics are plentiful. For starters, both rely on interpreta-
tion, and thus intentionality, appropriation, and precedent. A classical example 
of  legal creativity is the case of  an English lawyer, Arundel Coke, convicted of  
assault in 1721 (Howell, 1816/2006, pp. 53-94). While he confessed to conspir-
ing to maim his victim, one Edward Crispe, Coke attempted unsuccessfully to 
plead his innocence to the judge, after the jury’s guilty plea was handed down, 
on the basis that the law under which he was convicted, the Coventry Act, 
forbade maiming rather than murder; Coke confidently proclaimed to the judge 
his intention not merely to disfigure but to kill Crispe. Similar invocations, often 
similarly futile, of  the “letter of  the law” have been central to the U.S. Federal 
government’s long struggle to use the Constitution to justify interference with 
the extensive police powers granted to states by the same founding document 
(Gerstle, 2015). Meanwhile, after the passage of  the Civil Rights Act and other 
measures prohibiting discrimination in hiring, creative interpretation of  the 
“letter of  the law” became the means by which businesses have evaded Federal 
restrictions (Edelman, 1992).
In Unfair: The New Science of  Criminal Injustice, Adam Benforado (2015) mar-
shals considerable evidence on the unreliability of  techniques used to “solve” 
crimes, based on the dysfunctional procedures and unfounded intuitive certainty 
exercised by judges, prosecutors, witnesses, jurors, and police. He notes that 
“procedural rules do not actually constrain officers, prosecutors, and judges very 
much at all; they only appear to do so” (p. 244). An historic instance of  legis-
lative art Benforado recounts is the virtuosic performance of  Sergeant Charles 
Duke, expert defense witness for the LAPD officers whose brutal beating of  
Rodney King was caught on video; Duke’s technique was to play the video back 
almost frame by frame, carefully justifying each blow and kick individually. Sun 
Tzu’s ancient admonition in The Art of  War (n.d.) that “all warfare is based on 
deception” (1.18) perhaps then applies to legal practices as well as war. For his 
part, Benforado advocates for constraints on this interpretive freedom, prescrib-
ing legal solutions that remove subjective interpretation, but without an eye to 
unintended consequences. 
Nonetheless, this freedom to interpret, and the manifold futures it entails, 
is key to the aesthetics hidden in and the artifice permitted by law. The literati 
have had a role in politics throughout world history (Weber, 1919/n.d., p. 9). 
Since the days of  the Roman Empire, rhetoric has been taught to those enter-
ing practices of  law and administration (Bowersock, Brown, & Grabar, 1999, p. 
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power of  the European aristocracy in the Middle Ages was always inseparable 
not only from theology but also from the pageantry of  high office. In The Struc-
tural Transformation of  the Public Sphere (1962/1989), Jürgen Habermas discusses 
the central role of  art and literature at courtly salons in creating a space for 
critical political discourse in modern Europe. Today, the central role of  media 
in modern democracies dominates the popular political imaginary, while objects 
and performances continue to distill public political participation into memora-
ble images. In the U.S. these include the “die-in” actions of  Black Lives Matter 
protestors, the barricades that street activists have used for over a century (Gis-
sen, 2015), or the “kettling” formations that police have developed to contain 
such protestors (Sorli, 2014). In varied ways, these appropriations stem from 
the production of  ambiguous legal language as a necessary element of  building 
political consensus in a democracy (Thacher, 2001).
In a series of  lectures delivered in 1977-1978 and published as Security, 
Territory, Population (2004), Michel Foucault tracks the emergence in Europe 
throughout the Middle Ages of  a model of  sovereignty based on the shepherd, 
which he calls “pastoral power,” and traces the transformation of  this power 
into new forms in the modern era. He quotes the influential early Christian 
theologian Gregory of  Nazianzus, who uses the phrase “art of  arts” and 
“science of  sciences” (cited on p. 151) to describe this pastoral guidance of  
men. This form of  government fades into the background in his account of  
the modern era, but, while Foucault does not make this connection explicit, 
the pedagogical caretaking he describes appears to inform a Romantic politi-
cal vision that Friedrich Schiller famously described as “aesthetic education” 
(1794/2004), and that Joseph Beuys dubbed “social sculpture” (Tisdall, 1974, p. 
48).  
Though he traces the birth of  modern political science to a backlash 
against the “artfulness” of  Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince (p. 87), Foucault 
nonetheless repeatedly describes the evolution of  modern statecraft as “art.” 
He famously synthesized these inventions under the heading of   “governmen-
tality,” describing a uniquely modern approach of  soliciting the consent of  the 
governed, versus a more traditional notion of  absolute sovereignty. Of  course 
the term “art,” denoting artifice, refers exclusively to aesthetic activity neither in 
French nor English, but the parallels between creative and governmental “art” 
are not merely homonymous in Foucault’s reading. The autonomy that the artist 
begins to develop in the Renaissance, for example, seems not at all distinct from 
the way in which Foucault describes the original understanding of  the coup d’etat 
as a kind of  drama in which the state creates its own rules and acts on its own 
behalf  (p. 342). 
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gy has a great deal to do with the notion of  police. He quotes the Renaissance 
historian Louis Turquet de Mayerne, who defines “police” as “everything that 
gives ornament, form, and splendor to the city” (cited on p. 313). If  there is a 
police aesthetic, it is one of  order and harmony, and, as in any artwork, main-
taining appearances requires a great deal of  effort. French republican political 
philosopher Jean de Dieu d’Olivier published an “Essay on the Art of  Legis-
lation” (1815/2009), in which he says that “the art of  legislation becomes very 
difficult, since it consists in the organization of  a censorship that obstructs nei-
ther too much nor too little a fair liberty” (p. 136). This cosmetic labor extends 
to history itself; as Edmund Burke observed, “there is a sacred veil to be drawn 
over the beginnings of  all government” (cited in Ward & Waller, 1914, p. 23)
The creative mobilization of  American intelligence, security, and police 
forces against political dissent in the 1960s provides a striking example of  a 
dynamic in which state forces emulate their antagonists, whether real or imag-
ined. One example is especially relevant to Reynolds’ work on behalf  of  people 
imprisoned in segregation units in Illinois. After the Korean War the CIA, along 
with academic and private interests, began studying Chinese imprisonment 
and interrogation techniques, particularly the use of  solitary confinement, in 
order to disrupt the activities of  U.S. political activists; one result was the 1963 
publication of  the KUBARK Counterintelligence Training Manual (Guenther, 
2013, Kindle location 1628). In 1972, these techniques began being implement-
ed in a Federal prison at Marion, Illinois, in which a “control unit” response to 
a protest and strike by political prisoners (Gómez, 2006) marked an important 
step toward the contemporary supermax prison. 
One example of  the creative dialectic engaged in political struggles can be 
seen in the exposure through litigation of  the FBI’s COINTELPRO program, 
in which numerous advocacy organizations were infiltrated and hundreds of  
activists were targeted for investigation, framing, or assassination in the 1960s. 
The program was first revealed by a carefully planned burglary of  an FBI office 
in 1971 by a group calling itself  The Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the 
FBI. The People’s Law Office in Chicago, through a long civil suit beginning 
in 1976, helped to expose thousands of  documents on the FBI’s operations 
against the Black Panther Party in Chicago (Taylor, 2013). 
Recent attempts both to cover up and to expose extralegal violence by the 
Chicago Police Department against poor people of  color have continued to 
inspire ingenuity on both sides, most recently in the collaboration of  journal-
ists, lawyers, and activists to expose a one-year cover-up of  the police murder 
of  Laquan McDonald that allowed Mayor Rahm Emanuel to retain his seat in a 
tight re-election campaign (Black, 2015). Describing another strategic reversal, 
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6Nikole Hannah-Jones (2015) writes about how the deployment of  white college 
applicant Abigail Fisher, in a conservative legal challenge to Affirmative Action 
in college admissions, echoed a tactic used by the NAACP during the civil rights 
era, when they challenged laws using plaintiffs “who would elicit both sympathy 
and outrage” (para. 4).
This interplay of  resistance and repression can occur within one move-
ment. And, as proven by the Islamic State (a.k.a. IS, ISIS, ISII.), such a move-
ment can make aesthetically refined use of  sophisticated communication strat-
egies. Kurt Slawitschka (2015) describes the IS media operation as “a top-down 
industry of  production with a comprehensive strategy, realized vision, and 
unified message: we are here, we are strong, and we are coming for you” (para. 
3). Slawitschka reports that, just from observing the group’s many videos, it is 
clear that a professional operation is in place, and making effective use of  high-
end consumer-grade technology. At one point an Android app was available to 
instantly download IS-posted Twitter links, such as a #WorldCup hashtag that 
linked soccer fans to an image of  a decapitated head, with the caption “This is 
our football. It’s made of  skin” (para. 9). 
The visually consistent IS message of  cruelty and purity, fusing police 
discipline and military exuberance, recalls Anna Chave’s association of  1960s 
Minimalist art with the aesthetics of  both multinational capitalism and Nazi 
propaganda (1990), but also the millenarian paranoia that has typified U.S. 
state-sponsored public-safety messaging from the Cold War to the current War 
on Terror (Masco, 2014). Along those lines, the wearing of  orange jumpsuits by 
hostages in IS execution videos is widely taken to reference similar outfits worn 
by military detainees at the U.S. Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba (Bennett, 
2015), thus contributing to the group’s published agenda to antagonize the West 
into open confrontation (Atran & Hamid, 2015)-- a provocation that dramati-
cally magnifies the militarist spectacles undertaken in the early 20th century by 
the Italian Futurists. 
It also calls to mind a video illicitly recorded in 1988 by imprisoned Illinois 
serial killer Richard Speck, in which he sports breasts grown with smuggled 
hormones, and does cocaine with and performs fellatio on his prison husband; 
the 1996 public release of  this video was instrumental in building political will 
to approve construction of  the Tamms supermax prison (Eisenman 2009, p. 
40). Tamms is the all-solitary prison that Laurie Jo Reynolds and her group 
Tamms Year Ten worked for five years to shut down. The vehement reaction to 
this provocative video is reminiscent of  the public outrage at many avant-garde 
artworks-- in particular, the 1989 controversy over the National Endowment for 
the Arts, in which Congressional conservatives such as Jesse Helms denounced 
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Finley. 
Art as Law
Gallery artists offer various strategies for how legislative art can be introduced 
in an institutional setting. Following in the institutional critique tradition of  
Fred Wilson, Cameron Rowland appropriates objects, in the manner of  Marcel 
Duchamp’s “readymades.” While Duchamp’s found objects created the possibil-
ity for what Lucy Lippard (1973/1997) would eventually call the “dematerialized 
art object,” Huey Copeland (2013) relates readymades to earlier forms of  legal 
subjection, saying that, long before Duchamp “turned a urinal into a work of  art 
through a series of  enunciative acts in 1917, black bodies were subject to even 
more arbitrary and binding shifts in their categorical status, ready-mades avant 
la lettre”  (p. 18). Similarly, Rowland brings together objects that recount the his-
tory of  slavery with products made by contemporary prison labor. Through the 
unremarkable nature of  the artifacts on view, he uses Duchamp’s “anti-aesthet-
ic” (Foster, 1983) to convey a sublime sense of  what Hannah Arendt famously 
called, “the banality of  evil.”
Much as with Duchamp, Wilson, and Rowland, the artist Carey Young 
makes use of  the aura of  the gallery to comment on often invisible aspects of  
capitalist culture. She appropriates legal discourse in videos, installations, and 
performances that reference the language of  legal documents such as wills, 
national constitutions, and commercial contracts. The way in which Young takes 
on explicit forms of  law is lighthearted and accessible, but it points to the cre-
ative latitude involved in legal interpretation.
Defying modernist denunciations of  seductive aesthetics (Adorno & 
Horkheimer, 1944/2002), Trevor Paglen derives elements of  sublime beauty 
from sites of  state secrecy. Along with co-authoring Torture Taxi (Paglen & 
Green, 2006), an investigative report on extraordinary rendition, he has visually 
documented classified American spaces and objects, including distant military 
installations, defense intelligence satellites, underwater communications cables, 
and official patches awarded to elite spies, with an aesthetic that evokes the 
misty spiritualized paintings of  Caspar David Friedrich. The tension created 
by Paglen’s adorned (and thus non-Adorno) approach to exposing government 
secrets has, along with some official surveillance (Weiner 2012, para. 7), earned 
him some critical suspicion (Kastner, 2015). More Swiftian than Romantic, the 
2008 video Episode III: Enjoy Poverty has viewers follow the Dutch artist Renzo 
Martens as he tours war-ravaged areas of  the Congo in order to offer a devas-
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performing his inability to escape his own narcissism, and his equal inability to 
offer the natives a means of  economically exploiting their own poverty. More 
recently, he has established an arts colony in Congo with the explicit aim of  
“gentrifying the jungle.” 
Each in their way, all of  these artists simultaneously convey and confound 
a message. This is similar to what laws do, opening up new options while 
foreclosing others, and it also recalls the practice of  teaching. Like a conceptual 
artist, a teacher presents not only content, but a situation intended to make it 
meaningful. Both the resistance of  the audience and the aspiration to induce a 
transformation, as opposed to simply providing enjoyment, are built into the 
project of  conceptual art, just as they are with education. 
Truth in Art and in Law
Presaging the analogy Foucault makes between “raison d’etat” and artistic 
autonomy, Walter Benjamin identifies “art pour l’art” with fascism in his critique 
of  the Italian Futurists (1935/1968, p. 242). Pierre Bourdieu, however, is more 
of  a skeptic as to the relevance of  art to authority, opining that “one cannot 
read a piece of  Dadaist poetry at a Cabinet meeting” (1982/1991, p. 113). Yet, 
in a slighting comparison of  Martin Heidegger to Marcel Duchamp, he inad-
vertently points out an important way in which art and philosophy operate in 
parallel with legal hermeneutics. 
The relations which are established between the work of  a great 
interpreter and the interpretations or over-interpretations it so-
licits… resemble perfectly… those which, since Duchamp, have 
developed between the artist and his group of  interpreters; in 
both cases, the production anticipates the interpretation(.) (p. 154)
But all art, not only Duchamp’s, functions through its circulation in and 
legitimation by a community of  privileged interpreters, as do political actions. 
Bourdieu acknowledges this a bit later: “A political intention can be constituted 
only in one’s relation to a given state of  the political game, and, more precisely, 
of  the universe of  the techniques of  action it offers at any given moment” (p. 
173). Indeed, the early avant-garde took such “techniques of  action” as artistic 
material. Dada artists employed mock trials as a form of  performance, as just 
one of  many gestures intended to engage with the procedures and conventions 
of  rule-making, while the Futurists are perhaps best remembered for their pro-
pagandistic manifestos and their glorification of  war. 
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is a creative speech which brings into existence that which it utters” (p. 42). 
Granted, of  course, that the law is recognized as legitimate by its subjects. On 
the other hand, the pandering he identifies in Social Realist art (p. 235) echoes 
the reproduction of  distinctions he repeatedly denigrates in education. Indeed, 
legitimacy is rarely conferred by objects of  education (the students), but only 
bestowed third-hand upon those whom Jacques Lacan refers to as the “subjects-
supposed-to-know” (1964/1977, p. 232). For all the promotion of  populism 
among today’s social practice artists, an arena of  contemporary art where it 
would be proper to locate Laurie Jo Reynolds, it is noteworthy that the experi-
ence of  such art is often not so much that of  a focus group, as Marxist skep-
tics sometimes think (Cronan, 2013), but that of  a classroom. The classroom 
for Foucault is a place for imparting discipline, and may be one of  the most 
straightforward examples of  a “pastoral” setting, in which a teacher is responsi-
ble (often to the point of  loss of  employment) for the success or failure of  his 
vulnerable charges. 
Art and politics are incoherent but undeniable, embodying more than de-
picting truth beneath the surface: truth that is, however momentarily, taken up 
as knowledge. In The Truth in Painting (1978/1987), Jacques Derrida talks about 
Paul Cézanne’s commitment to truth as a performative promise.
Its performance does not promise, literally, to say, in the con-
stative sense, but again to “do.” It promises another “perfor-
mance”… with no descriptive or “constative” reference, the 
promise makes an event (it “does something” in uttering). (p. 3, 
sic)
This is not the same kind of  speech act referenced by Bourdieu. What a piece 
of  art offers to do is often merely to undo itself; to the extent it makes a state-
ment, it challenges its universal applicability. 
Through the contingent event of  their temporary existence, artistic perfor-
mances and revolutionary gestures can either underwrite or undermine state-
ments of  necessary and eternal law. “Let the dead bury their dead,” writes Karl 
Marx (1852/1978, p. 597), eulogizing the failure of  Louis Bonaparte’s democrat-
ic bourgeois “revolution.” In contrast, he asserts:
Proletarian revolutions…. criticize themselves constantly, inter-
rupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to 
the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride 
with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses, and 
paltrinesses of  their first attempts, seem to throw down their 
adversary only in order that he might draw new strength from the 
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earth and rise again, more gigantic before them, recoil ever and 
anon from the indefinite prodigiousness of  their own aims, until 
the situation is created which makes all turning back impossible (.) 
(pp. 597-598)
A perhaps lurid example of  this foundational inconsistency was a stabbing 
that occurred in December 2015 at the Art Basel art fair in Miami, an act that 
many took to be an artistic performance—although, ironically, heightened 
security prompted by IS-linked attacks the previous month in Paris permitted a 
swift response (Rayne, 2015). Such absurd vignettes truly are the stuff  of  both 
contemporary art and political intrigue—to misquote Marx, they simultaneously 
embody both tragedy and farce.
Conclusions
Ruth Ronen (2014) writes: “Art… exhibits the fact that the law… cannot regu-
late what it claims to regulate” (p. 90). Perversion, absurdity, fear, and repulsion 
comprise the truth of  legal violence, and so art is needed to supplement the 
incompleteness of  law. Carey Young treats the legal apparatus of  capital as a 
game, while Cameron Rowland mines it for artifacts. Trevor Paglen ominously 
re-enchants and Renzo Martens tragically but satirically confronts the political 
sausage-processing that Laurie Jo Reynolds effectively conceals behind a sur-
face of  task-based documentation of  her advocacy efforts. But all these cases 
underscore how art can be relevant to the political truth of  everyday life: not 
through forced attempts in art classes to emulate (aesthetic) representations, but 
by demanding legitimacy, insisting on recognition, and demonstrating the failure 
of  (legal) representations. 
The ideas of  conceptual artists influence my approach to teaching art, by 
affecting how I think about the institutional and discursive relationship of  art 
and education. As I mentioned earlier, that doesn’t mean that there’s any partic-
ular curricular outcome of  the comparisons I’ve laid out, in terms of  concrete 
art projects. Instead, the way in which artworks and laws work to sabotage both 
each other and themselves might encourage a sense of  humility about the au-
thority of  the art teacher, while relieving the burden of  providing students with 
an ineffable experience magically detached from evaluation and the politics of  
the educational apparatus. 
Twentieth century art education scholarship has had much to say about 
expression, discipline, and visual culture; the artwork invoked by these scholars 
thus tends to be, respectively, varied expressionisms, traditional art-historical 
objects, and art referencing contemporary popular culture. But conceptualist art 
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has not gotten its art-educational due, and it is a tradition at least as relevant to 
contemporary fine art as the three aforementioned. In addition, a point I have 
sought to make by discussing art’s relationship to law is that this is a context 
that exists in the wider world, and such an approach denies the insular self-refer-
entiality that prompts people of  all ages to remain skeptical of  fine art. Instead 
of  dumbing art down, trying to make art classrooms (merely) a day spa, a guild 
apprenticeship, or an image-surfing party game, it could be worthwhile to start 
discussing ways to open up the intellectual and social aspects of  both art and 
schooling. 
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